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In 1967, two years after Singapore’s Independence, the 
Urban Redevelopment Authority launched its first Sale of  
Sites Program in the Central Area for private development, 
in conjunction with an infrastructural network expansion 
program. The People’s Park Complex in the heart of  
Chinatown was one of  fourteen such sites. It replaced the 
old People’s Park which was a market of  makeshift stalls 
that spread over a hectare. This paper examines the building 
of  the People’s Park Complex from its conception as a new 
typology of  privately-owned public space to its realization as a 
social and commercial center in Chinatown for the “common 
people.” It contends that the Complex narrated a process of  
nation-building where Chinese culture, in particular, was 
codified and typified under the rubric of  multiculturalism as 
a direct response to Singapore’s diasporic composition. The 
Complex was imbricated in intersecting nascent ideologies. 
The monolithic multi-use building bore witness to how 
the various interests of  the developer, the architect and the 
government-as-planner were aligned to project the imaginings 
of  the Chinese diaspora onto the podium-tower typology which 
was already charged with the universal ideals espoused by its 
Euro-American proponents. The merging of  infrastructure 
and architecture championed by the post-war avant-gardist 
groups such as the Team 10 and the multi-disciplinary Ekistics 
Society was furthered by the Asian counterparts from the 
1960s, most prolifically by the Metabolist group in Japan and 
within the nation, by the Singapore Planning and Urban 
Research group (SPUR) where some of  the core members were 
consultants to the government or officials. The five-year plan as 
a national initiative based on social and economic development 
which included the provision of  new public spaces provided 
the challenge for the young and foreign-trained intellectual 
architects to reformulate and contextualize the international 
wave of  humanism in architecture and planning for Singapore. 
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The People’s Park Complex occupies the site of the previous 
“People’s Park Market”—a market and shopping center of single-
storey shops and makeshift structures that was popular amongst 
locals and tourists. Its historical significance can be traced back to 
Singapore’s founding in 1819, where the section of the city south 
of the Singapore River was allocated to the Chinese population, 
mostly immigrants from South China. Chinatown evolved out of 
such a form of colonial containment that identifies the Chinese as 
a diaspora, not allowing their demographic advantage to dominate 
the culture. Under the British, the containment created through 
segregation (and consequent overcrowding) had produced a 
historic template for a constricted mixed-use neighborhood where 
the domestic and commercial co-existed, in the form of large 
blocks of continuous rows of back-to-back shophouses.1 Public 
space within this urban rubric was limited to the street or edge, 
the market, the temple, the river and residual fields and vacant 
lots.  
“People’s Park” was one of such open spaces intended for excess 
and leisure. From the onset, this open space was occupied by 
hawkers selling food, clothing and housewares. It functioned as 
the Chinese counterpart to the Padang – a green field designated 
for colony-wide celebrations, parades and recreational sports like 
cricket and lawn tennis– on the other side of the River. By 1950, 
the “People’s Park Market,” rampant with illegal hawkers, was 
already the social and economic hub of Chinatown, triggering the 
colonial government to advocate for the rebuilding of Chinatown 
to deal with “the appalling overcrowding.” That government 
dissolved before any plan was drawn.2 Following Independence, 
the condition of racial containment was altered, yet the specific 
steps taken to secularize and contain cultural identity were no less 
explicit. Within this were efforts at social integration and marketi-
zation that were often conflicted. 
A fire that broke out on Christmas night of 1966 wiped out most 
of the makeshift structures and sealed the fate of the People’s Park 
Market. The new Government, together with the developer and 
his architect, began a systematic process of re-allocation, recon-
struction, and reinvention of People’s Park as a privately owned 
interior public space. No longer residual, it was a project of urban 
design based on market principles, and co-financed, planned 
and managed by the State. Whereas the architects provided the 
modern work-live container, the State as regulator and event-pro-
grammer conditioned the types of sociability that traversed the 
1. By the turn of the twentieth century, 
Chinatown was singled out as the most 
problematic and unhygienic area that 
urgently needed improvement. The Singapore 
Improvement Trust was formally established 
in 1927 to clean up the most crowded parts of 
the city’s center. Back lanes were driven into 
densely-packed urban blocks and buildings 
demolished to give way to open spaces and 
parks.
2. “The Hawker Report,” Straits Times, 
November 24, 1950, 6.
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building complex and by extension, the new citizenry. Even as 
a privately-owned entity, the complex—from its operations and 
demographic to the maximization of its building footprint, its 
rigidly delineated sectional datum of commercial and residential 
to its continuous shopping interior and atrium event space—
presents itself as a simulacrum of the city, a miniaturization of 
the State apparatus. This was especially the case during the first 
two decades of nation building, where its position as a hub was 
repeatedly emphasized by its various proponents (state, developer, 
architect), as it played host to many cultural celebrations and 
national education exhibitions. 
The People’s Park Complex was one of fourteen urban sites sold to 
private developers in the Central Area. Designed by DP architects 
in 1967 and opened for business in 1970, the project embodies 
the paradox of an urban architectural model for social integra-
tion within a developmental framework. It has been celebrated 
as an exemplary urban architectural model that is specific to its 
place and historical condition where the nationalizing moment 
intersected the architectural context of the 1960s.3 Its architec-
tural proponents share the preoccupation with architect-designed 
public gathering places of the CIAM, Team 10, Urban Design 
at the GSD, and the Japanese Metabolist Group. As Fumihiko 
Maki commented when he visited during the project’s construc-
tion, “We theorized and you people are getting it built.”4 Rem 
Koolhaas called it “a brutal high-rise slab on a brutal podium” 
that is “in fact a condensed version of a Chinese downtown, a 
three-dimensional market based on the cellular matrix of Chinese 
shopping —a modern-movement Chinatown.”5 
The mid-1960s seemed to be a moment where the architect as 
urban designer was given the space to translate public policy 
and programmatic concepts to advocate for the realization of an 
urban potential in an emerging architectural design. Yet conflict, 
a condition common to contemporary cities, was not present in 
the accounts of the project by these commentators and historians. 
Maki, reflecting upon the first Urban Design Conference at 
Harvard in 1956, pointed out the value of competitions as spaces 
for reflection on issues of reconstruction after cities experience 
complete or partial destruction. “As long as, and precisely because 
the city is incomplete,” he wrote, “emphasis on any particular 
direction calls forth dissent and challenges that in turn opens up 
new possibilities.”6 In the case of the enforced partial destruction 
of Chinatown for urban renewal, that contested space for reflec-
3. See for example, Tan Kok Meng, “After 
Tabula Rasa: Nodal City Singapore,” Lotus 
International 108 (2001): 21-29. Also, Wong 
Yunn Chii, Singapore 1:1 City: A Gallery of 
Architecture & Urban Design (Singapore: 
Urban Redevelopment Authority, 2005). 
Norman Edwards and Peter Keys, Singapore: 
A Guide to Buildings, Streets, Places 
(Singapore: Times Books International, 
1996). Prior to these, Rem Koolhaas situated 
this project as avant-gardist in his essay 
“Singapore Songlines: Portrait of a Potemkin 
Metropolis… or Thirty Years of Tabula Rasa.” 
Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau, S,M,L,XL 
(New York: Monacelli Press, 1995), 1008-89. 
4. William Lim, Cities for People (Singapore: 
Select Books, 1990), 8. 
5. Koolhaas and Mau, S,M,L,XL, (New York: 
Monacelli Press, 1995), 1067.
6. Fumihiko Maki, “Fragmentation and 
Friction as Urban Threats: The Post-1956 
City,” Harvard Design Magazine “The Origins 
and Evolution of Urban Design” (Spring/
Summer 2006): 46.
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tion and debate was not created. The architecture of the People’s 
Park Complex was complicit to the State project of rebranding 
identity, incubating the consumer-citizen and symbolizing the 
embrace of the vernacular within the national. 
Rebranding Chinatown
Chinatown remained a prominent site under the Government’s 
inaugural urban renewal program, following the recommendation 
made by the team of United Nations Experts comprising Otto 
Koenigsberger, land and legal advisor Charles Abrams and traffic 
economist Susumo Kobe who conducted a survey of Singapore in 
1963.7 Their report on “Growth and Urban Renewal in Singa-
pore” served as the basis for the Urban Renewal Plan of 1964.8 
In February 1964, architect-planner Alan Choe, a graduate of 
Melbourne University and the Royal Melbourne Institute of Tech-
nology (RMIT), was tasked to head the Urban Renewal team, 
a subsidiary of the Building Department in the Housing Devel-
opment Board (HDB), to execute the Plan. The objective was 
to rejuvenate the old core of the city by making better economic 
use of the 1,700 acres of land. It proposed to rebuild the city 
completely in stages, and to build multi-storey blocks of apart-
ment houses, commercial houses, restaurants, hotels, theaters, 
shopping centers, markets, schools, multi-storey carparks, etc. 
Provision was made for a traffic circulatory system and mass 
transport system to accommodate four million people and half a 
million vehicles by the twenty-first century.9 The implementa-
tion of the Plan would be a joint venture with private enterprise, 
“for such a gigantic task as envisaged… maximum co-operation 
between the private and public sector is sine qua non.” 10 
The Plan was delayed due to the uncertainties of Singapore’s 
political situation. During the interim, from April 4 to August 7, 
1965, the HDB sent Choe on a four-month study tour of Europe 
and America, including a week-long trip to Tokyo en-route 
Europe. Two days after his return, Singapore became an inde-
pendent nation. The HDB celebrated the success of its Five-
Year Building Programme with “Housing Board Week” which 
consisted of a series of events and a housing exhibition at the site 
of a prison that was to be a major urban renewal project under the 
second Five-Year Programme. By this time, more than a third of 
the population of 1 million was already housed in public housing 
estates. At the end of 1965, the Urban Renewal team had grown 
from three to 76. It prepared a plan that divided the Central area 
into 17 precincts, nine in the north and eight south of the Singa-
7. The three-man team was preceded by E.E. 
Lorrange, an expert sent after the Government 
approached the U.N. for help. He presented a 
report after a 6-month long survey of the island 
on 1962.
8. Charles Abrams, Susumu Kobe, and Otto 
Koenigsberger. Growth and Urban Renewal 
in Singapore: Report prepared for the 
Government of Singapore (U.N. Programme of 
Technical Assistance Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, 1963).
9. “UN Experts go ahead for big city face-lift,” 
Starights Times, August 13, 1963, 4.
10. Housing and Development Board, HDB 
Annual Report 1963 (Singapore: Government 
Printer, 1963), 2.
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pore River. A scheduled programme of action was drawn up for 
action in each of the precincts based on priority. Redevelopment 
of two precincts, one in the North and one in the South began 
simultaneously. The strategy was “a two prong centrifugal action 
of redevelopment moving from North and south towards the City 
Centre.”11 Meanwhile, the Building Department conducted infor-
mation talks and activities to educate the people on the merits of 
urban renewal and to garner public support for the Government’s 
“earnest intentions” in anticipation of the acquisition of public 
open space by private enterprise.12 
The modernization of Chinatown via the People’s Park Complex 
began in 1967 with the setting up of the Urban Renewal Depart-
ment (URD), headed by Choe, as a separate entity from the 
HDB. The previous program of clearance and reallocation was 
expanded to a two-prong approach from the points of view of 
finance, resource and enterprise. On 16 June, the Minister of 
Law and National Development E.W. Barker announced a $90m 
plan for 14 urban redevelopment projects that the Government 
would carry out with private enterprise. This was to be the first 
program of its kind in the world in which private participation 
on such a scale was promoted by a government. He extended the 
invitation to investors both in Singapore and abroad, highlighting 
their roles as investors of the new nation. “Urban renewal, in fact, 
thrives on private participation,” he stated.13 The Government 
provided incentives in the form of installment payment for land 
purchase (20% down payment and the balance of 80% to be 
spread over ten years without interest) and property tax exemp-
tion for six months, plus one month per storey of the building to 
be constructed. Developers could choose to carry out the sketch 
plans provided by the URD, or amend them, or reject the Govern-
ment’s and submit their own. Successful tenders were based on 
the premium offered, the capital investment, the employment 
generated and the revenue potential, as well as the architectural 
merits. 
The URD’s explicit call for contemporary building types that 
manifest its ideals in urban development was met with many 
responses, mostly from developers who had not built such 
large-scale mixed-use buildings before. Each came paired with 
a local architectural firm led by young ambitious foreign-trained 
architects. Twenty-five year old Singapore developer Ho Kok 
Cheong and DP Architects led by Koh Seow Chuan, William Lim 
and Tay Kheng Soon, won the tender to develop their 30-storey 
11. By the end of 1966, 90% of land in Precinct 
S.1 had been acquired and planning and 
preparation for the sites had begun. Housing 
and Development Board, HDB Annual Report 
1965 (Singapore: Government Printer, 1965), 
51.
12. Housing and Development Board, HDB 
Annual Report 1966 (Singapore: Government 
Printer, 1966), 62-64.
13. “$90m plan for a new look Singapore,” 
Starights Times, April 9, 1966, 6.
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People’s Park Complex which covered an area of 2.5 acres in 
late 1967. The complex was Ho’s first development project in 
Singapore as was DP Architects’ first urban project upon the 
office’s founding in 1967. Ho explained the importance of keeping 
the name of People’s Park as it was a name that had become 
“legendary in the hearts and mind of the citizens of Singapore a 
place of gaiety, life and activity.” “When completed,” he stated, 
“People’s Park will recapture and recreate the atmosphere on a 
larger and more sophisticated scale. It will also thrive and remain 
lit at night in keeping with its existing character.”14 This new 
space of consumption would be housed in a modern air-condi-
tioned building. 
Incubating the Consumer-citizen: private space of shopping and 
public space of the nation
Implicit in Ho’s statement was his desire to replace the old tenants 
with new ones who would be appropriate to occupy the new 
People’s Park Complex. The URD was in the process of reallo-
cating the shop owners and hawkers affected by the Christmas 
Day fire, first to an open space down the street and then into a 
shopping complex adjacent to the People’s Park site on Park Road 
and to another block of flats in Outram Road, a 15-minute walk 
southwest. From the announcement of the project to the opening 
of the shopping and parking podium in 1970, the People’s Park 
Complex garnered so much public attention that it overshadowed 
the other People’s Park building – a 9-storey Park Road Rede-
velopment project completed by the HDB  in late 1967. Located 
on the site adjacent to the Complex, the $2.3 million other 
shopping-cum-residential building comprised three floors of 290 
shops, 74 eating stalls, a crèche and a kindergarten, and six floors 
of two- and three-room flats. Its tenants witnessed the demolition 
of the old People’s Park Market in 1968 and then the rise of the 
31-storey $17 million People’s Park Complex out of 2.5 acres of 
rubble. In place of the 1-storey stalls and restaurants, rose the 
biggest and tallest shopping-cum-residential complex ever to be 
built in Singapore then. It contained 56 offices, 233 departmental 
stores and emporiums and 44 kiosks in the 5-storey shopping 
podium; and 98 one-room flats, 144-three-room flats and 18 
four-room flats in the 26-storey residential slab block. In an ironic 
anticipatory statement to mark the demolition, the developer Ho 
said: “We want to maintain the image of a people’s park.”15  
14. “People’s Park Complex: Singapore’s tallest 
building-to-be,” Straights Times, December 
1, 1967, 8. 
15. “Old Landmark goes,” Straights Times, 
June 18, 1968, 6.
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That image is at once a projection and construction. The URD 
worked in parallel with the developer to disperse the lower 
income “people” from the People’s Park. Choe estimated that six 
new low-cost dwellings nearby must be provided for every slum 
structure demolished.16 He saw the redevelopment project of 
shopping podium and residential block as the most appropriate 
type to accommodate Singapore’s projected density. Moreover, the 
complex embodied the ideals of a more physically and economically 
mobile citizenry. The three-storey podium of the HDB’s “People’s 
Park” was naturally ventilated with a large central open-air 
courtyard. On the third floor was an open play deck adjacent to 
the crèche, serving as a buffer zone between the bustling commer-
cial activities below and the residences above.17 It was the first 
State-provided crèche and play deck in the city center designed in 
response to the rapidly rising trend of working mothers as Singa-
pore’s expanding industries turned to women labor. Choe extended 
this notion of buffer zones to open space and parks as transitional 
zones “for pedestrians to move from one precinct to another.” He 
maintained that urban renewal was the only response to the city’s 
growth and the shopping-cum-residential complex was the archi-
tectural type complicit with the social and economic development 
of the city. 
The developer and the tenants association celebrated the modern-
ized version of Chinatown with organized activities marking 
major Chinese events, such as a pugilistic show and lion dance in 
conjunction with a “giant sale” to mark the Lunar New Year. The 
space was also frequently loaned to the Government for national 
education exhibitions – on pedestrian safety and traffic conscious-
ness, on home safety, on dental hygiene, etc.18 He demonstrated the 
idea of a “larger and more sophisticated” update of the old People’s 
Park by inviting businesses like the Czech’s Bata Shoe Company to 
set up their largest flagship store and Eastern United Trading to 
set up a departmental store selling home furnishings.19 Ho openly 
concurred with the government’s vision on urban renewal and 
policies on housing and development.20 As a patron of the Building 
and Estate Management Society (BEMS) he urged members to 
recognize their “tremendous responsibility” in maintaining all 
that had been planned and built, and to actively contribute to 
the growth of the city into a center of modern office towers and 
commercial complexes.21 Filled with throngs of shoppers from the 
day of its opening, the Complex was proffered as the model for 
other development in Singapore and Malaysia which began to be 
referred as “similar to the People’s Park Complex.22 
17. HDB, HDB Annual Report 1967. 
(Singapore: Government Printer, 1967), 
80-81; HDB Annual Report 1968 (Singapore: 
Government Printer, 1968), 79-80.
18. “Council plans pedestrian safety campaign,” 
Straights Times, Feburary 4, 1973, 6. 
“Disasters that strike in the home,” Straights 
Times, 26 Mar. 1973, 17. “Dental Health 
Week opens today,” Straights Times, October 
4, 1974, 9.
19. “New departmental store opens at People’s 
Park Complex,” Straights Times, December 
12, 1970, 12.
20. “Building career loses out to social 
prejudice,” Straights Times, December 2, 
1973, 4.
21. “Society has big responsibility to keep up 
rapid pace of building industry,” Straights 
Times, December 13, 1971, 9.
22. “Houses, shops on site of abattoir,” ST, 9 
March 1971, 7. Henry Chang, “Work starts 
on largest ‘shop-under-one-roof ’ centre in 
Malaysia,” Straights Times, October 20, 1971, 
14.
16. “Choe: Slums in city centre block 
progress,” Straights Times, April 18, 1967, 6.
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Symbolizing Network: Local and National
In mid-1967, Choe had presented a proposed sketch design at an 
estimated cost of $10million to demonstrate the URD’s objective 
of developing a shopping center with flats to minimize traffic and 
parking problems by bringing the residents close to their place 
of work.23 He referred to this new architectural type as one that 
houses an entire township and his description of the core of dense 
human and vehicular traffic departed from the ideas summarized 
at the Eighth CIAM Congress in Hoddesdon, England: “[T]
hat cars should arrive and park on the periphery of the Core, 
but not cross it.”24 The sketch model he presented showed three 
18-storey blocks of flats sitting atop a large 3-storey podium of 
shops. Parking was not incorporated in the complex. The archi-
tects’ elaborated upon Choe’s vision for the core with “an urban 
architectural prototype” that would not only house workplace, 
home and leisure within but would be part of a network of layered 
traffic in the area. However, they rejected the URD’s sketch plan 
and took advantage of the tax incentives by consolidating the 
three blocks into one massive 26-storey block and increasing the 
shopping podium to five storeys to accommodate 700 car parking 
spaces.25 The roof of the shopping complex was an expansive 
“garden” for the dwellers of the slab block of flats above. 
Where the private space of shopping and the public space of the 
nation coincides lies in the architectural expression of continuous 
mobility. The first two floors are served by three escalators and 
a covered overhead bridge connects the building to Chinatown 
across the street, echoing the CIAM 8’s focus on a city for the 
pedestrian and the Team 10’s notion of urban reintegration—a 
continuous space and surface connects one’s house through shops 
and onto the rest of the city (more shops). The covered bridge 
was the first of its kind in Singapore and a gift from the developer 
to the government. Programmatically, the project saw a parallel 
in Louis Kahn’s cylindrical structures for downtown Philadelphia 
where inhabitants and their cars cohabit within the same archi-
tecture. Whereas Kahn generated his cylindrical forms from the 
car, the architects produced a big box of a continuous shopping 
interior. 
The shopping complex was conceived as a continuous space that 
culminated in the multi-tiered atrium that the architects named 
the “city room.” Shops and stalls occupied the ground floor, 
evoking the previous market of makeshift stalls. The “city room” 
23. “New People’s Park,” Straights Times, June 
22, 1967, 7.
24. J. Tyrwhitt, J.L. Sert, E.N. Rogers 
(eds.). The Heart of the City: Towards the 
Humanization of Urban Life (London: Lund 
Humphries, 1952), 164.
25. Lim suggested that Choe had disagreed 
with them on this point and so they brought 
the matter up to the then Permanent Secretary. 
William Lim, email response to author, May 
3, 2013.
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was an arrangement of scales (of spaces), levels and movement 
designed to invite the people in and to accommodate them at 
a variety of ways and speeds. Lim and his partners educated 
the Government and of the people through the space of public 
access—this continuous public space is connected throughout the 
entire People’s Park site. The tiered triple-storey atrium with a 
sunken plaza for flash sales and bazaar events was accessible from 
each of the four sides of the complex, with all shops visible at one 
glance. 
The implication of interiorizing the street into an atrium is two-
fold. On the one hand, it suggests a kind of transparent, demo-
cratic space in which the “safe” and “neutral” activity of shopping 
would take place. Yet it is also precisely this formal architectural 
act that produces a socially engineered public space whereby 
the users belong to a self-selected class of shoppers. The other 
publics, when invited in for other events, invariably partook in 
the same consumption logic inscribed in the interior architecture. 
In contrast to the HDB’s open-air shopping space, the People’s 
Park Complex responded to the tropicality with an air-conditioned 
podium. It filled in the rest of the original site, leaving a wide 
strip of paved landscape connecting the main thoroughfare Eu 
Tong Sen Street and HDB’s other “People’s Park” building.26 
To the extent that the “city room” with multiple access doors 
from all directions is clearly contradictory to the maintenance of 
an air-conditioned interior was not raised, the idea of an urban 
continuum remains elusive. 
During the project’s construction, Choe outlined the Govern-
ment’s vision for rebuilding the city center that echoed the 
humanist ideas outlined in the CIAM’s The Heart of the City 
(1952) and expounded on Victor Gruen’s book Heart of the Cities 
(1964). He painted a vision for a city center of one-stop complexes 
to ensure that there will be night activities, and would contain all 
available amenities that cater to the needs of not only the tenants, 
but to the people of the locality and possibly the whole island. A 
continuous network of raised pedestrian walkways would ensure 
continuous mobility and urban integration between multi-level 
structures and shopping-cum-residential complexes and traffic 
infrastructure.27 In a national television programme months before 
its opening, Choe highlighted the People’s Park Complex to 
illustrate multi-level connections between buildings and precincts. 
He pointed out that not only did it exemplify urban continuity it 
also became an instant tourist attraction, an important aspect in 
26. The building was later known as the 
People’s Park Food and Shopping Centre.
27. See Chia Poteik, “New People’s Park,” 
Straights Times, June 22, 1971, 7. “People’s 
Park Complex: Singapore’s tallest building-
to-be,” Straights Times, December 1, 1967, 
8; “A peep at the exciting city of the future,” 
Straights Times, May 26, 1969, 5.
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the revitalization of the central area.28 Ho affirmed this, stating his 
intention to create “a new and modern Chinatown that will not 
only attract the local population but tourists as well.”29 
Re-centering Chinatown: Modern architecture for the Public 
That architecture was called out as one of the key criteria in 
the selection of an urban redevelopment project affirmed the 
Government’s recognition of the integral relationship between 
architecture and nation building. Post-colonial India and Nehru’s 
modern city of Chandigarh was a reference study site for Malayan 
architects in the Public Works Department (PWD) and the 
HDB. Choe had also visited many of these architects’ urban 
projects and was familiar with CIAM’s modern planning schemes 
and ideals. In addition, he was familiar with the join exhibition of 
visionary architecture and housing held at the National Library of 
Singapore in March 1963, a few months before the arrival of the 
UN team. The former were exhibits on loan from the Museum 
of Modern Art New York, and consisted of 74 large photo panels 
and explanatory texts showing 45 un-built architectural projects 
by 30 architects that date back to 1916 up to the 1960s, including 
the Metabolist group. The latter showed models and photographs 
of housing estates completed by the HDB in its first five-year 
program. The public exhibition contributed to the zeitgeist of the 
time, where the State looks to private enterprise and the creative 
energies of its professionals to collaborate in the nation-building 
endeavor. This was best expressed in the opening address of S. 
Rajaratnam, the Minister of Culture: 
Singapore ten years ago was not a real city … In these photo-
graphs and models you see a vision that has become a reality 
for something like 17 per cent of the population … An artist’s 
dream, combined with the skill of architects, planners and 
builders, provides homes for nearly 300,000 people.30 
Maki’s subsequent pronouncement “we theorized and you people 
are getting it built” was an uncanny response to Rajaratnam’s 
description. DP Architects’ urban architectural design of a shop-
ping-cum-residential complex was the result of a feasibility report 
produced by the young team. In 1957, immediately upon his 
return from Harvard on a Fulbright scholarship at the Depart-
ment of City and Regional Planning, William Lim was partner 
of the architectural firm Malayan Architects Co-Partnership. He 
30. “Housing ‘a dream come true’ – Raja,” 
Straights Times, March 19, 1963, 4.
28. “A peep at the exciting city of the 
future…,” Straights Times, May 26, 1969, 5.
29. “Coming up fast, grandest complex in 
Asia,” Straights Times, September 30, 1969, 
5. “Hey big spender, happiness is a many 
splendoured shopping centre,” Straights Times, 
July 26, 1970, 12.
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then co-founded DP Architects with local graduate Tay and 
Melbourne graduate Koh in 1967. The People’s Park Complex 
was his and Ho’s first major collaboration. They had previously 
worked on some smaller projects together. Lim attributed the 
project’s influence to “the Modernist movement spearheaded by 
Le Corbusier and subsequently the Team 10 members,” many of 
whom he got to know quite well.31 As a student at the Architec-
tural Association (AA) in the early 1950s, he was influenced by 
“brutalists architects” John Killick (1924-71), William Howell 
(1922-74) and Peter Smithson (Team 10) as well as the archi-
tect-planner Otto Koenigsberger who founded the Department 
of Development and Tropical Studies at the AA in 1953.32 As 
an observer at the last CIAM meeting chaired by Team 10 
members, he witnessed the debates concerning the ideological 
shift towards a systems-based network approach to cities—a 
mode of discourse that would have a lasting impact on his own 
mode of intellectual production. 
Lim attributed his theoretical knowledge on economic develop-
ment to individuals like Greek architect-planner Constantinos 
Doxiadis and Fumihiko Maki during his year at Harvard under 
the deanship of Josep Lluís Sert.33 It was also there that he met 
Jaqueline Tyrwhitt who recommended him to take many courses 
in planning law, development economics and public administra-
tion.34 He developed an intellectual leaning towards social equity 
and justice, and first learnt of the urban ideas of Jane Jacobs 
and Kevin Lynch.35 He explained that the feasibility report was 
the result of knowledge gained from his time at Harvard and 
that it was his partners and he who convinced the developer to 
pre-sell the units before the completion of the Complex to fund 
the project. He also revealed that although the commission of the 
project was through a URD open bid, not many others tendered 
for the project possibly because the lot was very big.36 Together 
with Tay and Koh—all three were aware of Victor Gruen’s mall 
projects in the U.S.—they approached the project with the atti-
tude of looking “for our own solution.”37 
Lim and Tay, together with a group of like-minded academics 
and practitioners, had formed the Singapore Urban Planning 
Research (SPUR) group in 1965 during the most intense 
months of the country’s independence. In a series of intensive 
workshops and research activity that spanned over six years, 
SPUR produced two publication—SPUR 65-57 and SPUR 
68-71—which presented the core members’ collective ideas on 
31. William Lim, email response to author, 
May 3, 2013.
32. It became the Development Planning Unit 
of the University College London where he 
moved to until his retirement in 1978. Lim 
took William Howell’s design studio at the 
AA and learnt of the latter’s concern with 
integrating building programs with social 
needs. Both Killick and Howell was part of 
the team of architects in the London County 
Council Housing Department responsible 
for the design of Alton West estate at 
Roehampton. J.M. Richards, rev. Catherine 
Gordon, “Howell, William Gough [Bill] 
(1922–1974),” Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography. See, John R. Gold, The Practice 
of Modernism: Modern Architects and Urban 
Transformation, 1954-1972 (London; New 
York: Routledge, 2007). C.f. Eric Mumford, 
The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928-1960 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), 
238-65.
33. See Richard Marshall, “Josep Lluís Sert’s 
urban Design Legacy,” in Eric Mumford (eds.), 
Josep Lluís Sert: The Architect of Urban 
Design, 1953-1969 ed. (New Haven; London: 
Yale University Press, 2008), 130-43. Koolhaas 
emphasized the influence of Maki and the 
Japanese Metabolist Group in making a case 
for the the project being demonstrative of the 
emergence of a “non-white avant-garde” in the 
1960s. Koolhaas and Mau, S,M,L,XL, (New 
York: Monacelli Press, 1995), 1054, 1067.
34. Lim, email response to author, May 30, 
, 2013.
35. Lim, email response to author, May 30, 
2013..
36. Lim, email response to author, January 
30, 2013.
37. Lim, email response to author, January 
30, 2013.
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Singapore’s urbanism as well as papers by international affiliates 
such as Koichi Nagashima and Tyrwhitt.38 The group aimed for 
academics and professional bodies to be involved in the city’s 
urban development through collaborative and multi-disciplinary 
research; and made frequent suggestions and urban proposals 
to the Government. The group referenced the Ekistics Group 
formed in the late 1950s by Doxiadis and Tyrwhitt. Lim cham-
pioned efforts in environmental planning, arguing for a more 
humanistic multi-perspective approach towards development. 
In 1971, he outlined a 13-point criteria for urban development, 
where he cautioned the haste in demolition including large areas 
unaffected by major roads and the single approach of removal 
towards slums. In terms of private development, “compensation 
would be adequately given to the urban poor,” he wrote. “The 
demolition of these buildings do not and cannot solve the prob-
lems of the slum dwellers.”39 
Implicit in Lim’s statement is a self-critique of the process of the 
People’s Park Complex, that despite the avant-gardist stance, 
the architects did not participate in any conversations regarding 
URD’s renewal and reallocation process. Architectural and urban 
design was sequential rather than reciprocal as desired by the 
advocates in SPUR. And despite the outwardly ideological align-
ment between the State and the architects, at a certain economic 
level, SPUR’s model for social integration differs from the 
development model of the nation state in that it aims to accom-
modate various types of legalities (even illegalities), complexity, 
and irrationality.40 Lim, quoting Victor Gruen, argued for “a 
city of compactness, intensity of public life, and a small-grained 
pattern in which all types of human activities are intermingled in 
close proximity.”41 In that regard, it aligns more with the complex 
multi-disciplinary systems model of Doxiadis and the inclu-
sive open-ended model of the Metabolists. In the People’s Park 
Complex, these ideas translate to an interior urbanism of small 
stores over the big department store of supermarket model, the 
provision for admixture of public and private domain to accom-
modate greater numbers; and within the big space are intimate 
spaces and places of nooks and crannies.42 
As the first privately-owned public space in Singapore, not only 
did the Complex cater to its own residents and tenants–a sizeable 
population equivalent to a small estate–it was the shopping 
centre for the “local publics” of Chinatown and to the rest of 
the rapidly industrializing population in the new nation eager 
39. William Lim, “The City Core – Heart 
of the Metropolis,” SPUR 68-71 (Singapore: 
Eurasia, 1971), 37-40.
38. Jacqueline Tyrwhitt, “Town Planning 
Notions – Some Rethinking.” Talk to SPUR 
members, January 1971, SPUR 68-71 
(Singapore: Eurasia, 1971), 66-68.
40. See for example, “Pirate Taxis in 
Singapore” which gives an idea of SPUR’s 
position towards the existing elements of 
the city. Rather than complete removal by 
regulation which was the Government’s 
tendency, they recommended and multi-
perspective approach to framing the problem 
and a multi-prong solution instead of 
simply getting rid of them. This attitude 
is consistently maintained as evidenced in 
subsequent position papers by Lim. For 
example, his paper presented to the Southeast 
Asian Study Group for Architecture and 
Urbanism in Singapore. Lim, “A Plea for 
Complexity and Irrationality in Architecture,” 
Cities for People: Reflections of a Southeast 
Asian Architect (Singapore: Select Books, 
1990), 30-38.
41. Lim, “The City Core,” 41
42. Lim, “The City Core,” 37-40.
43. “Sarawak team tours two Housing Estates,” 
Straights Times, June 9, 1971, 9. “Hey big 
spender, happiness is a many splendoured 
shopping centre,” Straights Times, July 26, 
1970, 12. 
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expertise,” Straights Times, December 21, 
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to exercise their newly found economic freedom.43 With more 
and more men and women employed in the new factories and 
companies that were being set up under the national initiative of 
economic growth and efficiency, most weekend itineraries include 
shopping at People’s Park. Tyrwhitt, during a visit to Singapore 
in 1970, remarked that what impressed her most about the city’s 
architecture was the “commercialism with a human face”; and 
cited the People’s Park Complex as an exemplary urban model of 
a “strongly commercialized but very human business centre.”44 
The success of People’s Park’s mixed-use formula triggered the 
government’s issuance of a directive for major commercial proj-
ects to provide at least three floors of residential space. Devel-
opers had the option of either converting at least three storeys 
of existing office buildings for residential accommodation or, for 
those still on the drawing table, to add at least three storeys more 
to the buildings.45 Such an overarching schema to populate the 
commercial core was met with skepticism by many architects. 
The general sentiment amongst them was that the People’s Park 
Complex was a unique case where its location ensured the daily 
presence of crowds of shoppers, whereas this was not necessarily 
so at many other sites. Chinatown was the first of three sites 
developed to highlight the “Instant Asia” theme. As part of the 
nation’s multi-racial agenda, each had an ethnic focus—Chinese, 
Malay, and Indian. 
The People’s Park Complex became the urban prototype for 
housing the new citizenry. From the impetus for the demolition 
of the old People’s Park to its public tender, design, building, 
reoccupation and use, each step of the process embodied the 
ideologies of the new nation. It exemplifies a moment of large- 
scale modernist visions where public and private enterprise 
equate urban development as necessary massive removal of entire 
neighborhoods and rebuilding of instant “cities.” The “instant 
city” of the People’s Park Complex is a model of a shopping 
center based on a merger of commercial and humanist interests 
that has yet been refuted. Together with URD’s People’s Park, 
DP’s People’s Park was meant to provide public spaces for the 
residents in Chinatown – many of them crowded the complex 
to “escape” their rented homes of cramped bed-spaces—and for 
the population that had relocated or relocating into suburban 
housing estates. With all the shops and emporia under one roof 
in an air-conditioned space, the Complex became the instant 
nexus of Chinatown. But the vision of urban integration in the 
45. “Homes in the new office buildings in city,” 
Straights Times, April 3, 1971, 4.
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form of a networked city of pedestrians on continuous overhead 
bridges with vehicular traffic speeding below was not quite real-
ized within this mode of State-incentivized urban design. 
Nothing of the previous People’s Park remained, but the people 
of Singapore accepted their “park” which they were repeatedly 
reminded was a “gift” from the State and the developer.46 People’s 
Park “succeeded” and “the people like their new park, the Straits 
Times reported in 1970.”47 But there is no such thing as a free 
gift. The central question: “at what expense?” raised by Lim in 
his 1971 essay “The City Core—Heart of the Metropolis” in the 
local press was not pursued. By 1974, a new $40 million People’s 
Park Center opened across the street. Consisting of a shopping 
podium larger than Ho’s Complex and three towers housing 
mostly legal offices and flats, the government nor the owner no 
longer needed to explain why “the people” of Chinatown were 
systematically replaced en masse. Lee Kuan Yew, in his autobiog-
raphy, reiterated Choe’s 1968 statement that renewal was impera-
tive: “when we live in high-rises 10 to 20 stories high, incompat-
ible traditional practices had to stop.”48 Conceived and constructed 
in a period where the Government decried “Chinese chauvinism,” 
the People’s Park Complex and its two cousins stood as evidence 
of the remaking of a nation with an ethnic base but not a “China 
base” whereby race was purged of political affiliations to the 
country of origin (China) and all that is culturally symbolic and 
non-threatening were encouraged.49 Like the megastructures of 
the 1960s, the much-celebrated prototype was first and foremost 
symbolic. 
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